top of page

America Replaced Its Cyber Chief. It Has Not Yet Tested Its Own Story.

26 minutes ago
6 min read

Editor's note: This analysis reflects information available as of 12:00 p.m. Central time on November 21, 2026. Published accounts of why Sean Cairncross left his post conflict with one another. We label each account by its source and will update this post if the White House issues a fuller explanation.


The United States changed its top cyber adviser on November 19 after a week of outages. The official explanation has not yet been independently tested. Illustration: OSRS.
The United States changed its top cyber adviser on November 19 after a week of outages. The official explanation has not yet been independently tested. Illustration: OSRS.

Bottom line up front: The White House replaced its national cyber director on Thursday, November 19, after a week of major technology outages. Whether Sean Cairncross resigned or was fired is disputed. That question matters less than a second one. Senior officials told Congress within days that the outages were unrelated accidents. They are probably right. However, no independent team has tested that conclusion, and a change of personnel is not a substitute for a test.

Between November 12 and November 17, Americans watched email, air travel, online banking, and a classified intelligence network fail in turn. Two days later, the president's principal cyber adviser was gone. Many headlines joined the two facts with the words "after" or "amid." Readers were left to assume that one caused the other. The public record does not yet support that assumption, and it does not rule it out.

What Happened, and What Is Still Disputed

The confirmed facts are few.

  • Sean Cairncross left the Office of the National Cyber Director on Thursday, November 19. The Senate had confirmed him in August 2025.

  • Kirsten Davies, the Pentagon's chief information officer, took over in an acting capacity. Breaking Defense reported that Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the move.

  • A permanent director must be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Democrats take control of Congress in January.

The reason for the departure is contested. Three accounts are in circulation.

  1. He chose to leave. Axios first reported that sources described the exit as amicable and timed to allow a successor to be confirmed before January.

  2. He was pushed out. Axios later reported that two White House officials said the new chief of staff, Stephen Miller, sought the change because Mr. Cairncross "lacked the strong cyber credentials to perform the job."

  3. He was fired. Fox News described the departure as a firing by the president.

No official has said on the record that the outages caused the change. Analysts should therefore write "left the post" and attribute every motive to its source.

What the Office Does, and Why "Acting" Matters

Congress created the Office of the National Cyber Director in 2021. The director advises the president on cyber matters and coordinates policy across federal agencies. The director does not operate networks, restore airline systems, or repair bank software. Those tasks belong to agencies and companies.

That limit cuts two ways. It means the director could not have prevented a faulty update at a private firm. It also means the office exists for exactly this kind of week, when several agencies and industries need one coordinated account of events.

An acting director can do the work but holds the post without Senate confirmation. The office has been here before. TechCrunch notes that its first director left after about 19 months and that the post then sat without a permanent holder for about 10 months. Moreover, Breaking Defense reported that it is not clear who now performs the Pentagon chief information officer's duties.

"A change of personnel is not a test of the evidence. It only changes who must answer for the conclusion."

The Case for a Red Team, and the Case Against Alarm

On November 18, three senior officials testified before the House Homeland Security Committee. Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton said the disruptions were "not a coordinated or state-sponsored attack." Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin put his confidence at 98 percent. The FBI's deputy director said its cyber teams had found no sign of malicious activity.

The strongest case for accepting that finding deserves a fair statement.

  • Each failure has a named cause. Companies and agencies have attributed the incidents to updates, maintenance, or software faults.

  • There is a plausible common pressure. Reuters reported that experts and officials see rapid patching as a likely major factor. Artificial intelligence tools now find software flaws faster, so organizations push more fixes at once, and some fixes break things.

  • The replacement is a practitioner. Ms. Davies has led security programs in industry and at the Pentagon. Mr. Cairncross came to the post from party operations, not from the cybersecurity field.

Nevertheless, a careful analyst should notice what is missing. The conclusion arrived within days. It came from the same institutions that operate or oversee the affected systems. Early explanations from different officials were not consistent with one another, as The Record reported.

A red team is a group assigned to argue against the official view. Its job is to ask what evidence would prove the assessment wrong and then to look for that evidence. Senator Chuck Schumer has asked the administration to form one "to challenge the assumption that these outages are just business as usual" and to report to Congress by December 1. Readers may discount the politics. The method is sound regardless of who proposes it.

What Leaders Should Do Now

The lesson applies well beyond Washington. Consider three cases.

  • A hospital technology chief plans to install an urgent security fix across every clinic tonight. A staged rollout to one site first, with a tested way to reverse it, costs a day and may prevent a shutdown.

  • A police commander is asked whether a local outage is an attack. The disciplined answer states what is confirmed, what is not, and who will decide.

  • A company board hears that a failure was "just an update." It should ask who reviewed that finding and whether the reviewer was independent of the team that made the change.

A short checklist follows.

  1. Treat every large update as a planned risk, with a rollback plan.

  2. Ask vendors for notice before major changes to shared systems.

  3. Assign one person to challenge the first explanation of any incident.

  4. Prepare a holding statement before the next outage, not during it.

An Analyst's View

Red teaming is the discipline of telling a decision-maker what he or she would prefer not to hear. Its central questions are simple. What framework are you using? How did you arrive at that conclusion? What would change your mind?

Officials have answered the first question. They have not yet answered the third. Until they do, public confidence will depend on trust in the speaker, and trust is in short supply after a week like this one.

"The evidence points to accidents. Confidence in that finding should come from an independent test, not from repetition."

What Comes Next, and How OSRS Can Help

Watch for three things: a formal nominee for national cyber director, a written root cause from each affected organization, and any response to the request for a red team review by December 1. Evidence that would change our assessment includes a joint advisory from U.S. agencies, a disclosure of unauthorized access, or technical indicators published by a credible security firm.

OGUN Security Research and Strategic Consulting LLC serves an international audience that includes the intelligence community, law enforcement, academia, diplomats, and business leaders, and we present analysis to decision-makers in the United States and abroad. We can help your organization:

  • Run independent red team reviews of incident findings and risk assessments

  • Verify breaking claims before leadership responds

  • Assess dependence on shared technology providers and their update practices

  • Build crisis communication plans and holding statements for outages and cyber incidents

Contact us at contact@ogunsecurity.com.

Share this article with a colleague who approves system changes or speaks for your organization in a crisis, and subscribe to our email list to receive our update when a nominee or a root cause report is published.

Enjoyed this article? Stay informed by following us on Google News, Twitter, and LinkedIn for more exclusive cybersecurity insights and expert analyses.

About the Author

Dr. Sunday Oludare Ogunlana, Founder and CEO of OGUN Security Research and Strategic Consulting LLC, Professor of Cybersecurity, and national security scholar.

Intelligence. Protection. Strategy. www.ogunsecurity.com

Sources

Recent Posts

See All

Comments

Rated 0 out of 5 stars.
No ratings yet

Add a rating
bottom of page