Why ISWAP Likely Did Not Intercept Brigadier General Uba’s WhatsApp Communications
- Oludare Ogunlana
- Nov 19
- 3 min read
The tragic killing of Nigerian Army Brigadier General U. M. Uba by ISWAP after an ambush in the Lake Chad region has generated national debate. ISWAP claimed it intercepted his WhatsApp communication and location while he awaited rescue. This narrative, though sensational, is technically improbable. WhatsApp uses end-to-end encryption, which makes message interception extremely difficult without full device compromise. A more likely explanation is an insider threat, an issue that has historically undermined counterterrorism operations in the region. As emotions rise, it is vital to separate technical reality from speculation and understand the indispensable roles of credible intelligence, media transparency, and open source intelligence in national security.
Why WhatsApp Interception Is Technically Unlikely
WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption prevents third parties from reading messages in transit. For interception to occur, one of the following must happen:
The phone is compromised by spyware, or someone gains physical access to it.
An attacker takes over the WhatsApp account by gaining access to the verification code.
The user’s cloud backup is accessed if it is not encrypted.
None of these scenarios aligns with ISWAP’s operational sophistication. Breaking WhatsApp encryption requires extreme capabilities that only advanced nation-state actors possess. One example is Pegasus, a powerful surveillance malware used in the past by some governments to infiltrate devices silently. There is no credible evidence that ISWAP has acquired or deployed Pegasus-level spyware. Claims of intercepting WhatsApp messages are more reflective of propaganda, designed to create fear and exaggerate the group’s capabilities.
Insider Threat: The More Plausible Explanation
Insider threat, not external interception, remains the leading factor in compromised military operations globally. In Nigeria’s counterinsurgency environment, this possibility becomes even more pronounced. Insider-driven leaks require no hacking, no advanced surveillance, and no sophisticated equipment.
Possible insider-driven scenarios include:
Disclosure of operational movement by compromised personnel.
Soldiers or local collaborators sharing routes and timing.
Human intelligence leaks from non-digital sources.
Observers on the ground are passing information directly to ISWAP cells.
These channels have repeatedly proven more effective for insurgent groups than attempting to break encrypted communication systems.
Media Should Not Be Blamed: The Army Operates on Credible Intelligence
Public debate has attempted to blame journalists and bloggers for releasing early reports about the ambush. This reasoning is misplaced. The Nigerian military does not rely on social media noise to conduct rescue operations. Military responses are guided by:
Verified intelligence.
Surveillance from ground, air, and satellite assets.
Secured internal communication channels.
Command-level operational assessments.
Media coverage does not compromise classified rescue missions. Blaming the press distracts from deeper operational challenges and shifts attention away from the true causes of mission failure.
Open Source Intelligence Remains a Strategic Asset
Open source intelligence is a legitimate and essential tool for modern security operations. Law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and military units worldwide depend on OSINT to track extremist propaganda, monitor threats, analyze narratives, and support investigations. OSINT does not replace classified intelligence but complements it by adding context, patterns, and early warnings.
Intelligence value does not come from collection alone. It comes from skilled analysts who process and interpret raw information for decision makers.
Transparency Strengthens Counterterrorism Efforts
Information gaps allow terrorists to shape public narratives. When governments restrict information or communicate slowly, insurgent groups exploit the silence to spread propaganda and manipulate public perception. Transparent communication maintains public trust, counters misinformation, strengthens morale, and limits a terrorist group’s ability to weaponize falsehoods. Counterterrorism success requires both operational strength and informational credibility.
Conclusion
ISWAP’s claim of intercepting Brigadier General Uba’s WhatsApp communication lacks technical credibility. End-to-end encryption, combined with the absence of Pegasus-level spyware in ISWAP’s arsenal, makes such interception extremely unlikely. Insider threat remains the most plausible explanation for how the group obtained sensitive information. Media actors should not be blamed, and OSINT should be recognized as a strategic tool. A transparent information environment strengthens national resilience and denies terrorists the opportunity to control the narrative.
OGUN Security Research and Strategic Consulting LLC supports government agencies, military units, and private organizations with advanced intelligence analysis, OSINT training, cybersecurity advisory, insider threat programs, and counterterrorism research. Our team helps institutions strengthen operational security, enhance decision-making, and build resilient information ecosystems.
About the Author: Dr. Sunday Ogunlana is a cybersecurity professor, intelligence analyst, and Principal Consultant at OGUN Security Research and Strategic Consulting LLC, specializing in counterterrorism, OSINT, cybersecurity, and national security strategy.
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